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Australians are among the largest consumers of marijuana in the world, and 
estimates show that their expenditure on marijuana is about twice that on wine.  In this 
paper we analyse the evolution of marijuana prices in Australia and show that they have 
declined in real terms by almost 40 percent over the last decade.  This decline is far above 
that experienced by most agricultural products.  Why has this occurred and what are the 
implications?  The extensive adoption of hydroponic techniques in growing marijuana is 
likely to have enhanced productivity, with the benefits passed onto consumers in the form 
of lower prices.  We find patterns in the prices that divide the country into three broad 
regions: (i) Sydney, where prices are highest; (ii) Melbourne and Canberra, which have 
somewhat lower prices; and (iii) everywhere else, where marijuana is cheapest.  We also 
find that marijuana prices seem to be (positively) related to real estate prices.  A further 
finding is that the price declines have stimulated marijuana consumption by about 15 
percent, inhibited drinking (marijuana and alcohol being substitutes) and led to an 
increase in the real incomes of users in excess of $1 billion p. a. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Productivity enhancement has been primarily responsible for the long-term 
decline in the prices of many agricultural products.  Higher productivity, together with 
Engel’s l aw, has led to average annual price declines of these goods of the order of  
1-2 percent.  In large measure, this is part of the return to successful research and 
development (R&D) activities financed by the public and private sectors.  In this paper 
we demonstrate that a similar process seems to have operated with a product that receives 
no R&D support from the public sector, marijuana.  But there is one important difference: 
Marijuana prices have declined much more rapidly than those of most other agricultural 
products -- by about 5 percent p. a. in real terms.  This apparently exceptional behaviour 
of marijuana prices raises fundamental questions about what constitute “good” R&D 
practice.  As marijuana is an illicit good, information about new production techniques 
would not seem to be as freely available as it is for other products, and the patenting of 
product-specific innovations would not be possible.  In a similar vein, the publication of 
results would be problematic for research dealing with the production of an illicit good.
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Finally, research offering the possibility of improved productivity of an illicit good would 
not be eligible to attract public subsidies. 
 
Research on the behaviour of marijuana prices is also of interest due to the 
widespread use of the product.  Surveys indicate that in some countries up to one third of 
the adult population have used marijuana and in Australia, one of world’s biggest 
consumers, over 40 percent of people favour its decriminalisation (see Clements and 
Daryal, 1999, for details).  Expenditure on marijuana by Australians has been estimated 
to be about twice that on wine (Clements and Daryal, 1999).  To what extent has the 
decline in marijuana prices been responsible for the high level of consumption?  By how 
much h ave real incomes of users increased as a result of lower prices?  If marijuana  
consumption were legalised, should it be taxed to correct any negative externalities and to 
raise revenue? 
                                                 
1 There are of course exceptions to this general rule, such as research on the use of hydroponic techniques 
for growing vegetables and horticultural products that could possibly be applied to growing marijuana.  In 
this case, research on the legal and illicit products are good substitutes for each other.  
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In this paper we argue that there are three defining characteristics of the behaviour 
of marijuana prices, which we refer to as “three facts”: 
 
•  There seems to exist regional markets for marijuana, rather than one 
national market.  Prices are substantially more expensive in the Sydney 
market, followed by Melbourne and Canberra, and then the rest of 
Australia.  Interestingly, this pattern of marijuana prices seems to be 
correlated with housing prices. 
 
•  The real price of marijuana has fallen by almost 40 percent over the 1990s 
in Australia.  As indicated above, this fall is much more than that of  
most agricultural products.  We argue that the widespread adoption of 
hydroponic techniques of production is likely to have enhanced 
productivity; and the benefits of this boost to productivity have been 
passed onto users in the form of lower prices. 
 
•  Lower prices have stimulated consumption by about 15 percent.  Over the 
90s, on average the price of an ounce of marijuana declined by about  
$100;  as consumption is estimated to be about  .8  oz per capita p. a., this 
price decline has led to an annual increase in users’ real income of about  
$80  per capita, which roughly translates to more than  $1,000m  p. a. in 
the aggregate. 
 
The next section of the paper provides information regarding the data on 
marijuana prices.  Section 3 deals  with the identification of regional markets of 
marijuana.  The substantial decline in prices is analysed in some depth in Section 4 and 
compared to the behaviour of the prices of other commodities, including internationally-
traded agricultural goods and nontraded goods.  Section 5 provides some estimates of the 
extent to which lower prices have encouraged marijuana usage and discouraged the 
consumption of a substitute product, alcohol.  That section also contains an analysis of 
the impacts of the price decline on the real incomes of users.  Section 6 contains some 
concluding comments.  
3 
2.  The Data
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The data on Australian marijuana prices were generously supplied by Mark 
Hazell, of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI).  These prices were 
collected by law enforcement agencies in the various states and territories during 
undercover buys. In general, the data are quarterly and refer to the period 1990-1999, for 
each state and territory. The different types of marijuana identified separately are leaf, 
heads, hydroponics, skunk, hash resin and hash oil. However, we focus on only the prices 
of “leaf” and “heads”, as these products are the most popular. The data are described by 
ABCI (1996) who discuss some difficulties with them regarding different recording 
practices used by the various agencies and missing observations. 
 
The prices are usually recorded in the form of ranges and the basic data are listed 
in Clements and Daryal (2001).  The data are “consolidated” by: (i) Using the mid-point 
of each price range; (ii) converting all gram prices to ounces by multiplying by 28; and 
(iii) annualising the data by averaging the quarterly or semi-annual observations.  Plotting 
the data revealed several outliers which probably reflect some of the above-mentioned 
recording problems.  Observations are treated as outliers if they are either less than one-
half of the mean for the corresponding state, or greater than twice the mean.  These 
observations are omitted and replaced with the relevant means, based on the remaining 
observations.  The data, after consolidation and editing, for each state and territory are 
given in Tables 1 and 2 for leaf and heads, purchased in the form of grams and ounces.  
Columns 2-5 of Table 3 give the corresponding Australian prices (defined as population-
weighted means of the state prices), while column 6 gives a weighted mean of the four 
prices.  This is a weighted geometric mean, with weights reflecting the relative 
importance of the products in consumption; see Clements (2002) for full details.  In 
Figure 1 we plot the Australian average price and as can be seen, it exhibits a substantial 
decline over the 1990s, starting off at  $577  per ounce in 1990 and ending up nine years 
later in 1999  23  percent lower at $442. More will be said about this decline later in 
Section 4.
3 
                                                 
2 This section draws heavily on Clements and Daryal (2001). 
3 Note that the internal relative prices of the four types of marijuana have changed quite substantially over 
the period.  On average, the relative price of leaf/gram increased by 4 percent p.a., head/gram decreased by 
1 percent, leaf/ounce increased by 1 percent and head/ounce declined by 1 percent.  For details, see 
Clements (2002).  
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TABLE 1 
MARIJUANA PRICES: LEAF 
(Dollars per ounce) 
Year  NSW  VIC  QLD  WA  SA  NT  TAS  ACT 
Weighted 
mean 
Purchased in the form of a gram 
1990  770  735  700  802  700  700  910  630  747 
1991  1,050  770  700  770  700  700  1,050  642  852 
1992  1,060  700  630  700  560  700  700  630  798 
1993  583  711  683  653  630  665  613  595  645 
1994  998  698  648  700  630  665  443  753  779 
1995  1,085  700  560  700  630  735  560  753  797 
1996  1,400  793  665  753  630  788  508  700  949 
1997  1,400  490  560  653  630  718  525  613  843 
1998  1,097  735  630  467  653  683  467  723  798 
1999  1,155  636  700  556  630  700  642  700  816 
Mean  1,060  697  648  675  639  705  642  674  802 
Purchased in the form of an ounce 
1990  438  513  225  210  388  275  313  413  390 
1991  475  450  215  170  400  275  350  325  381 
1992  362  363  188  340  225  300  188  350  313 
1993  383  409  168  200  388  281  175  250  326 
1994  419  394  181  288  325  244  170  400  341 
1995  319  400  400  308  347  294  163  256  350 
1996  325  383  350  283  350  263  200  408  339 
1997  288  285  431  263  350  288  375  386  320 
1998  333  363  375  250  350  300  375  450  344 
1999  275  313  444  250  350  300  262  450  322 
Mean  362  387  298  256  347  282  257  369  343 
 
 
3.  Fact 1: Marijuana is Expensive in New South Wales 
 
Is the market for marijuana a nationally-organised activity, or is it merely a 
“cottage industry” that just satisfies local demand?  To put it another way, is 
marijuana a (nationally) traded good, or is it nontraded?  If there were a national 
market for marijuana, then after appropriate allowance for transport costs etc., prices  
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TABLE 2 
MARIJUANA PRICES: HEADS 
(Dollars per ounce) 
Year  NSW  VIC  QLD  WA  SA  NT  TAS  ACT 
Weighted                  
mean 
Purchased in the form of a gram 
1990  1,120  1,050  1,400  1,120  1,400  700  910  840  1,159 
1991  1,120  1,120  1,400  962  1,400  700  1,120  840  1,168 
1992  1,400  1,120  910  770  700  700  1,225  770  1,103 
1993  863  665  858  840  1,173  700  927  747  834 
1994  1,155  770  1,068  840  1,120  770  735  980  992 
1995  1,190  793  843  749  1,138  793  1,155  1,033  974 
1996  1,171  840  771  704  910  840  963  1,400  944 
1997  1,400  858  630  700  840  863  700  793  977 
1998  1,120  840  723  630  840  823  723  840  889 
1999  1,224  630  589  560  840  840  630  1,006  841 
Mean  1,176  869  919  788  1,036  773  909  925  988 
Purchased in the form of an ounce 
1990  600  650  413  600  400  325  525  463  557 
1991  600  550  425  502  200  325  450  375  504 
1992  375  450  388  390  363  450  425  500  401 
1993  500  348  363  431  450  363  344  383  419 
1994  550  367  328  400  425  325  363  550  432 
1995  538  400  320  354  438  358  350  438  430 
1996  550  400  398  325  406  283  388  525  444 
1997  550  400  538  300  400  358  383  442  466 
1998  488  388  550  275  340  325  367  450  437 
1999  513  400  300  250  400  300  325  479  403 
Mean  526  435  402  383  382  341  392  461  449 
 
 
should be more or less equalised across states and territories. This section investigates 
these issues.  
 
South Australia decriminalised marijuana in 1987 and recent media reports have 
focused on Adelaide as the centre of the marijuana industry.  Radio National (1999) 




MARIJUANA PRICES, AUSTRALIA 
(Dollars per ounce) 
  Purchased in the form of a 
  Gram    Ounce 




    (1)  (2)  (3)            (4)  (5)  (6) 
1990  747  1,159    390  557  577 
1991  852  1,168    381  504  547 
1992  798  1,103    313  401  454 
1993  645  834    326  419  446 
1994  779  992    341  432  475 
1995  797  974    350  430  476 
1996  949  944    339  444  484 
1997  843  977    320  466  489 
1998  798  889    344  437  473 
1999  816  841    322  403  442 
Mean  802  988    343  449  486 
Note:  The weighted mean, given in column 6, employs the following product weights: leaf/gram .06, 
















“Cannabis is by far and away the illicit drug of choice for Australians.  There 
is a multi billion dollar industry to supply it, and increasingly, the centre of 
action is the city of churches.” 
 
That program quoted a person called “David” as saying: 
 
“Say five, ten years ago, everyone spoke of the country towns of New South 
Wales and the north coast, now you never hear of it; those towns have died in 
this regard I’d say, because they’re lost out to the indoor variety, the hydro, 
and everyone was just saying South Australia, Adelaide, Adelaide, Adelaide, 
and that’s where it all seems to be coming from.” 
 
In a similar vein, a front-page story in The Weekend Australian (Williams, 2002) refers to 
South Australian police saying that marijuana production involves 
 
“…a sophisticated network…in which crops are grown hydroponically in 
suburban homes, pooled and shipped interstate in an industry worth $60 
million a year.”  
 
The article goes on to describe the industry in the following terms: 
 
“It is a complete web of organised crime, set up with equipment from a string 
of legal businesses that have flourished under the state’s liberal cannabis laws 
which, until recently, allowed  10  plants to be grown for ‘personal use’ with 
no penalty but a $150 on-the-spot fine.  
 
In 1990, Adelaide had three hydroponic stores. There were 52 in 2000 and 96 
by last year, according to police. 
 
Police say at least two bikie gangs run hydroponic chains, often supplying up 
to  $10,000  worth of equipment free in return for a cut of the crop.” 
 
Finally, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (1999, p. 18) commented on 
marijuana being exported from South Australia to other states as follows: 
 
“New South Wales Police reported that cannabis has been found secreted in 
the body parts of motor vehicles from South Australia…  
 
It is reported that cannabis originating in South Australia is transported to 
neighbouring jurisdictions.  South Australia Police reported that large amounts  
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of cannabis are transported from South Australia by air, truck, hire vehicles, 
buses and private motor vehicles.   
 
Queensland Police reported that South Australian cannabis is sold on the Gold 
Coast.  New South Wales Police reported South Australian vehicles returning 
to that state have been found carrying large amounts of cash or amphetamines, 
or both.  It also considers that the decrease in the amount of locally grown 
cannabis is the result of an increase in the quantity of South Australian 
cannabis in New South Wales.   
 
The Australian Federal Police in Canberra reported that the majority of 
cannabis transported to the Australian Capital Territory is from the Murray 
Bridge area of South Australia…” 
 
As the above considerations point to Adelaide being a major exporter of marijuana to 
other parts of Australia, this would seem to imply that the market is a national, not local, one. 
In turn, this would mean that marijuana prices would tend to be equalised across Australia if, 
as seems reasonable, transport and differences in other distribution costs were relatively 
minor.  The validity of this hypothesis can be examined with our regional-level data and 
Panel I of Table 4 gives the results of regressing the prices on dummy variables for each 
state and territory.  As NSW is used as the base, there are seven dummy variable coefficients 
for each of the four products.  Only two of these   28 4 7 = ·   coefficients are positive, 
leaf/ounce in Victoria and ACT, but these are both insignificantly different from zero.  The 
vast majority of the other coefficients are significant, which says that marijuana prices are 
significantly lower in all other regions relative to NSW.  Panel II of Table 4 transforms the 
estimated coefficients into percentage differences.  As it is convenient to summarise the 
results for the prices of the four products in terms of one number, the last column in the 
table gives the weighted mean difference for each region, with the weights reflecting the 
relative importance of each type of marijuana in overall consumption.  This column reveals 
that NT is the cheapest region with marijuana costing 32 percent less than that in NSW.  
Then comes WA (30 percent less), Tasmania (28 percent), Queensland (25 percent), SA 
(21 percent), Victoria (14 percent) and, finally, ACT (12 percent). 
 
Taken as a whole, the results of Table 4 could be interpreted as saying that 
Australia can be divided into three “super regions”:  
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TABLE 4 




rtu u rt e z ß a p log + ￿ + =
=
 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Product 
Leaf  Heads 





a  NSW   6.938  (134.6)  5.876  (77.7)  7.060  (108.3)  6.259  (106.0)  - 
bu  VIC  -39.80  (-5.46)  7.00  (.654)  -31.10  (-3.37)  -20.10  (-2.41)  - 
  QLD  -46.70  (-6.41)  -24.60  (-2.30)  -28.00  (-3.04)  -28.20  (-3.37)  - 
  WA  -43.40  (-5.95)  -34.90  (-3.26)  -40.90  (-4.44)  -34.50  (-4.13)  - 
  SA  -47.70  (-6.54)  -3.60  (-.336)  -14.40  (-1.56)  -33.50  (-4.01)  - 
  NT  -38.00  (-5.21)  -23.70  (-2.22)  -41.40  (-4.49)  -43.60  (-5.22)  - 
  TAS  -51.20  (-7.02)  -37.90  (-3.54)  -27.40  (-2.97)  -29.80  (-3.57)  - 
  ACT  -42.90  (-5.89)  1.40  (.131)  -24.80  (-2.69)  -13.40  (-1.60)  - 
2 R   .440    .284    .230    .281     
II. Transformed coefficients 
Price in NSW ($/oz)  1030.7  356.4  1,164.4  522.7  603.1 
Percentage difference from NSW price       
VIC  -32.83  7.25  -26.73  -18.21  -14.17 
QLD  -37.31  -21.81  -24.42  -24.57  -24.65 
WA  -35.21  -29.46  -33.57  -29.18  -30.22 
SA  -37.94  -3.54  -13.41  -28.47  -20.95 
NT  -31.61  -21.10  -33.90  -35.34  -31.50 
TAS  -40.07  -31.55  -23.97  -25.77  -27.76 
ACT  -34.88  1.41  -21.96  -12.54  -11.85 
Notes:   1. The variable  prt is the price of the relevant type of marijuana in region r  (r =1,…, 8) and year t;  
                  and  1 z rtu =   if  u = r,  0  otherwise. 
  2. The estimated bu coefficients in Panel I are to be divided by 100. 
  3. In Panel II, the estimated price in NSW is computed as exp (a); and the percentage difference of  
      the price in state u from that in NSW is computed as 100 · {exp (bu) – 1}. 
  4. The weights used in the last column are given in the note to Table 3.   
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1.  NSW -- expensive marijuana. 
2.  Victoria and ACT -- moderately-priced marijuana. 
3.  The rest -- cheap marijuana. 
 
While there is scope for debate regarding where the regional boundaries should be drawn, 
it is clear from the significance of the regional dummies in Table 4 that prices are not 
equalised nationally.  But this conclusion does raise the question of what could be the 
possible barriers to inter-regional trade that would prevent prices from being equalised?  
Or to put it another way, what prevents an entrepreneur buying marijuana in NT and 
selling in NSW to realise a (gross) profit of more than 30 percent?  While such a 
transaction is certainly not risk free, is it plausible for the risk premium to be more than 30 
percent?  Are there other substantial costs to be paid that would rule out arbitraging away 
the price differential?  To what extent do the regional differences in marijuana prices 
reflect the cost of living in the location where it is sold?  One admittedly imperfect 
measure of the cost of living is the price of housing in the location.  Table 5 analyses 
differences in housing prices in capital cities over the 1990s.
4 The last column of the table, 
which gives the percentage differences relative to housing prices of Sydney, can be directly 
compared with the marijuana prices of the last column of Table 4. As can be seen, although 
the ranking of regions for marijuana prices is not exactly the same as that of the 
corresponding cities for housing prices, the two sets of prices are clearly positively 
correlated. 
 
The comparison of prices for marijuana and housing is facilitated in Figure 2 which 
plots the two sets of prices relative to NSW/Sydney. The broken ray from the origin has a 
slope of 45
0 and as the scales of both axes are inverted, the vertical distance between this 
line and any point measures the difference in the housing-marijuana relative price between 
the city/region in question and that in Sydney. This relative price is thus higher for Darwin, 
                                                 
4  These data were generously provided by David Wesney, Manager, Research and Statistics, REIA, 
Canberra. The data take the form of quarterly median sale prices of established houses and units (where the 
latter include flats, units and townhouses) for the period 1990-99.  The quarterly data are then annualised by 
averaging.  
  11 
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATES OF HOUSING PRICE EQUATIONS 




rtu rtu u rt e z ß a p og l  
 (t-values in parentheses) 
Type of housing 





a  Sydney   5.33  (120.3)  5.11  (115.4) 
bu  Melbourne  -26.94  (-4.30)  -30.80  (-4.92) 
  Brisbane  -47.24  (-7.54)  -38.95  (-6.22) 
  Perth  -55.03  (-8.78)  -65.50  (-10.46) 
  Adelaide  -60.63  (-9.68)  -61.85  (-9.87) 
  Darwin  -33.36  (-5.32)  -37.39  (-5.97) 
  Hobart  -70.02  (-11.18)  -72.48  (-11.57) 
  Canberra  -31.72  (-5.06)  -31.42  (-5.02) 
2 R   .683  .709 
 
II. Transformed coefficients 
Price in Sydney ($’000)       206.6  165.7   
Percentage difference from Sydney price     
Melbourne  -23.62  -26.51  -24.34 
Brisbane  -37.65  -32.26  -36.30 
Perth  -42.32  -48.06  -43.76 
Adelaide  -45.46  -46.12  -45.63 
Darwin  -28.37  -31.20  -29.08 
Hobart  -50.35  -51.56  -50.65 
Canberra  -27.18  -26.96  -27.13 
Notes:   1. The variable  prt is the price of the relevant type of housing in city  r  (r =1,…, 8) and year t; 
                   1 z rtu =   if  u = r,  0  otherwise. 
  2. The estimated bu coefficients in Panel I are to be divided by 100. 
3. In Panel II, the estimated price in Sydney is computed as exp (a); and the percentage difference 
of  the price in state  u  from that in Sydney is computed as 100 · {exp (bu) – 1}. 
  4. The weights used in the last column are 0.75 for houses and 0.25 for units.   
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and lower for the rest. An equivalent way of interpreting the figure is to note that as along 
the 45
0- line the two price changes are equal, all points on the line correspond to the 
elasticity of marijuana prices with respect to housing prices being equal to unity; and for 
the points above (below) the line the elasticity is greater than (less than) unity. 
Accordingly, in all cities other than Darwin this elasticity is less than unity.  The solid 
line in Figure 2 is the least-squares regression line, constrained to pass through the 
origin.
5 As can be seen, the slope of this line is positive, but substantially less than unity. 
The estimated elasticity is 0.61 and has a standard error of 0.07, so that the elasticity is 
significantly different f rom both unity and zero. Since the observation for Darwin lies 
substantially above the regression line, we can say that marijuana prices in that city are 
cheap given its housing prices, or that housing is expensive in view of the cost of 
marijuana. Interestingly and unexpectedly, the reverse is true for Adelaide: Among the 
seven non-Sydney cities, given its housing prices, marijuana would seem to be most 
overpriced in the “Marijuana Capital of Australia”! Of course, one could equally interpret 
this as just  saying that housing is underpriced in the “City of Churches”.
6 The final 
interesting feature of the figure is that the above three super regions defined with respect 
to the cost of marijuana – (i) NSW/Sydney, (ii) Victoria/Melbourne and ACT/Canberra, 
and (iii) the rest – also hold with respect to housing costs, as indicated by the shading in 
the figure. 
 
The above discussion shows that marijuana prices are at least partially related to 
the cost of housing in the corresponding region. This can be interpreted as supporting the 
idea that the market for marijuana is not a national one, but a series of regional markets 
that are not too closely linked. Another interpretation is that a substantial part of the 
overall price of marijuana reflects local distribution activities, and housing prices are a 
(partial) index of these costs.
7 
                                                 
5 As prices are all expressed in terms of percentage differences from NSW/Sydney, any fixed effects have 
been differenced out. 
6 The slope of a ray from the origin to any of the seven cities in Figure 2 is the elasticity of marijuana prices 
with respect to housing prices for the city in question. Visually, it can be seen that this elasticity is lower 
for Canberra than Adelaide. But as this elasticity is the percentage change in marijuana prices for a unit 
percentage change in housing prices, it should not be confused with using the regression line to identify 
anomalies in the pricing of marijuana. The vertical distance between any observation and the regression 
line represents the extent of mispricing.  
7 In Clements (2002) quarterly and semi-annual data are used to explore further the issue of regional price 
differences.  While there are some differences in detail between the two sets of results, the overall 
conclusion remains that, on average, NSW is the most expensive region for marijuana in the country.   
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FIGURE 2 
 
MARIJUANA AND HOUSING PRICES 
 



















4.  Fact 2: Marijuana has Become Substantially Cheaper
8 
 
Table 6 shows that over the 1990s marijuana prices have fallen by about 23 percent in 
nominal terms (column 2), and 35 percent relative to the CPI (column 5).  The last entries in 
columns 10 and 11 of this table reveal that on average over the decade, marijuana prices in terms of 
consumer prices fell by 4.9 percent p.a. and by 5.7 percent p.a. in terms of alcohol prices.  Figure 3 
plots the paths of real marijuana prices in the form of both levels and log-changes.
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TABLE 6 
     
MARIJUANA, CONSUMER AND ALCOHOL PRICE INDEXES 
 
                       
  Levels    Log-changes  ( 100 · ) 
                     




























                           
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)    (10)  (11) 
                           
                           
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0               
                           
1991   94.9  103.2  104.5    91.9  90.8    -5.26  3.17  4.40    -8.43  -9.66 
                           
1992   78.7  104.2  107.5    75.5  73.2    -18.71   .98  2.86    -19.70  -21.58 
                         
1993   77.3  106.1  111.1    72.8  69.6    -1.75  1.80  3.28    -3.56  -5.04 
                           
1994   82.4  108.1  114.8    76.2  71.8     6.35  1.88  3.26    4.47  3.09 
                           
1995   82.6  113.2  119.3    73.0  69.2    .25  4.53  3.85    -4.28  -3.60 
                           
1996   83.9  116.1  124.2    72.3  67.6     1.64  2.58  4.03    -.94  -2.39 
                           
1997   84.9  116.4  127.3    72.9  66.7    1.09   .25  2.43    .84  -1.34 
                           
1998   81.9  117.4  128.9    69.8  63.6    -3.51   .85  1.25    -4.36  -4.76 
                           
1999   76.6  118.7  -    64.5  -    -6.77  1.13  -    -7.87  - 
                           
Mean  -  -  -    -  -    -2.96  1.91  3.17    -4.87  -5.66 
                           
 
Note: MPI = marijuana price index; CPI = Consumer Price Index; and API = alcohol price index. 
 
Sources:  The MPI is from column 6 of Table 3 with 1990 = 100; the CPI is from the DX database, rebased such that 1990 = 100; and the API is a levels 
version of a Divisia index of the prices of beer, wine and spirits, from Clements and Daryal (1999).  
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FIGURE 3 
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Why did prices fall by so much?  One reason is that the growing of marijuana has 
been subject to productivity enhancement by the adoption of hydroponic techniques
9, 
which lead to a higher-quality product containing higher THC levels.
10  For example, 
hydroponically-grown marijuana from northern Tasmania has been analysed as containing 
16 percent of THC, while that grown outdoors in the south of the state contained  
12.8 percent (Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, 1996).  Hydroponically-grown 
plants use no soil.  The hydroponic system manages the plants’ growth by creating an 
artificial climate that controls exposure to light, heat and nutrients in order to produce a 
better product and faster g rowth.  Plants are grown in containers filled with a sterile 
growing medium -- such as gravel, sand or vermiculite -- and the nutrients, which plants 
normally absorb from soil, are supplied to the roots through a water-nutrient mixture.  For 
further details of these techniques see, e.g., Asher and Edwards (1981) and Ashley’s Sister 
(1997).  The ease of concealment, and near ideal growing conditions which produce good-
quality plants, are the main reasons for the shift to hydroponic systems.  According to the 
Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (1996),  
 
“Hydroponic systems are being used to grow cannabis on a relatively large 
scale.  Unlike external plantations, hydroponic cultivation can be used in any 
region and is not regulated by growing seasons.  Both residential and 
industrial areas are used to establish these indoor sites.  Cellars and concealed 
rooms in existing residential and commercial properties are also used…The 
use of shipping containers to grow cannabis with hydroponic equipment has 
been  seen in many cases.  The containers are sometimes buried on rural 
properties to reduce chances of detection.” 
 
The newspaper article in Box 1 reports rapid growth in the number of stores 
supplying hydroponic activities in the late 1990s in WA and the situation is probably not 
too different in other states. According to the Yellow Pages telephone directory, in 1999 
Victoria had 149 hydroponics suppliers, NSW 115, SA 69, Queensland 59 and WA 58.  
One suspects that many of these operations supply marijuana growers.  Some indication of 
the nature of clientele served by these hydroponic suppliers is given by the advertisement  
                                                 
9  The word hydroponic means “water working”. 
10  The content of the main psychoactive chemical  Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) determines the 
potency and the quality of marijuana.  This is evidenced by the fact that flowers (so-called “heads” or 
“buds”), which contain more THC than leaves, are considerably more expensive.  
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BOX 1 
 































in Figure 4, reproduced from X-Press Magazine, which declares itself to be “Australia’s 
biggest free weekly magazine”.  Judging by the nature of the other advertisements 
(drums, guitars), this publication seems to be directed at younger people who are unlikely 
to have an interest in traditional gardening. 
Suppliers Cash In – But Mum’s the Word 
 
 
WA’s hydroponic store owners and suppliers estimate up to 15 percent of their business could 
come from marijuana growers.   
 
But most surveyed by  The West Australian said the industry had been tarnished unfairly by its 
association with the drug trade and denied they were making a fortune from people chancing their 
hand at marijuana.   
 
The number of hydroponic stores in WA has doubled in the last two years to nearly 40 shops and 
there is a modest but expanding industry of about 25 large-scale commercial growers producing 
everything from cherry tomatoes to orchids.   
 
Store owners and suppliers guessed that anywhere between 5 and 15 percent of sales were for 
growing marijuana but said there was an unwritten rule that it was never mentioned.   
 
Shaun Reid, who runs The Highlife Company, said: “No one will say that they are doing it because 
it is an indictable offence.  Theoretically, no one grows (hydroponic) marijuana.  We get told that 
they are growing daffodils but you can sometimes assume otherwise.”   
 
Mr Reid, who estimated about 10 percent of customers would use the equipment for marijuana 
growing, said many growers were older smokers scared of dealing with the criminal element.   
 
North Perth’s Home Grow Shop manager Lise Bysterveld said that if a customer dropped hints that 
they were going to use the equipment for marijuana growing, she would try to distance herself 
from them.  “I would say that I do not want to know that,” she said.   
 
The industry had enormous potential for commercial vegetable, flower and herb producers, she 
said.   
 
Canning Vale commercial supplier Aquaponics owner Robert Vanaurich said hydroponics 
accounted for more than half of the cherry tomatoes grown in WA, up from almost nil 10 years 
ago.  
 
Source: The West Australian, February 6, 1999, p. 9.  
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How do m arijuana prices compare with those of other commodities?  In an 
influential article, Grilli and Yang (1988) analyse the prices of 24 commodities which are 
traded internationally.  We convert these to relative prices (using the US CPI) and then 
compute the average annual log-changes over the period 1914-86; for further details, 
see Clements (2002).  Figure 5 gives the price changes for the 24 commodities plus 
marijuana.  The striking feature of this graph is that marijuana prices have fallen the most 
by far.  The only commodity to come close is rubber, but even then its average price fall 
is one percentage point less than that for marijuana (-3.9 versus - 4.9 percent p.a.)  There 
is a substantial drop off in the price declines after rubber -- palm oil –2.3 percent, rice  
–2.2 percent, cotton –2.0 percent, etc.  Surprisingly, the price of tobacco, which might be 
considered to be related to marijuana in both consumption and production, increased by 
.9 percent p.a.  Note also the minerals (aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, tin and silver) tend 
to lie in the middle of the spectrum of prices and have agricultural products on either 
side.  The declines in most of the commodity prices reflect the impact of productivity 
enhancement coupled with low income elasticities.  Additionally, in earlier parts of the 
twentieth century, the area devoted to agriculture was still rising in some countries, and 
this would have contributed to the downward pressure on commodity prices. 
 
What about the prices of other goods which are not traded commodities?  Figure 6 
presents a selection of relative prices from  The Economist (2000/01).  Again, these are 
average annual log-changes, but this time averaged over the period 1900 – 2000.  As is to 
be expected, labour-intensive services (such as the cost of a hotel room, a butler and a 
theatre ticket) increase in relative terms.  The prices that fall include those that are (i) 
predominantly agricultural or resource based (coffee, wine, eggs and petrol); and (ii) 
subject to substantial technical improvements in their manufacture and/or economies of 
scale (e.g., car, clothing, refrigerator, electricity).  To illustrate, consider the price of cars: 
According to The Economist (2000/01) “Henry Ford’s original Model-T, introduced in 
1908, cost $850, but by 1924 only $265: He was using an assembly line, and, in a 
virtuous circle, was selling far more cars.  Over the century the real price of a car fell by 
50 percent.”  The quality-adjusted price of a car, and some other goods, would have 
fallen even further, as recognised by  The Economist (2000/01).  If we omit the cost of 
phone calls as a possible outlier (as its price falls by 99.5 percent over the entire 
century!), the good whose price falls the most is electricity.  But even electricity prices 
fall by only 2.8 percent p.a., substantially below that of marijuana (4.9 percent). 






Source: X-Press Magazine, 24 February, 2000.  Issue No. 680, p.72. 
 
 
  In a well-known paper, Nordhaus (1997) analyses the evolution of the price of 
light over the past 200 years.  He uses the service characteristic provided by light, 
illumination, which is measured in terms of lumens.  He notes that a “wax candle emits 
about 13 lumens [and] a one-hundred-watt filament bulb about 1200 lumens”, which 
shows that the flow of lighting service from different sources of light has increased 
substantially.  Nordhaus constructs an index of the true (or quality-adjusted) price of light 
in real terms.  This index falls from a value of 100 in 1800 to a mere 0.029 in 1992  
(Nordhaus, 1997, Table 1.4, column 3), which represents an average price decline of 4.15 
percent p.a., or a log-change (x 100) of -4.24 p.a.  As the real price of marijuana has an 
annual average log-change (x 100) of -4.87 (see column 10 of Table 6), marijuana in 
terms of light on average falls by -4.87 - (-4.24) = -0.63 p.a.  If past trends continue, this 
implies that the number of years for this relative price to fall by k  x  100 percent is  
log (1-k) / -.0063.  It thus takes about 35 years for the price of marijuana relative to light 
to fall by 20 percent, which shows that this relative price is fairly constant.  One 
interpretation is that the production of both goods has been subject to similar degrees of 
productivity improvement.  















































Source:  Marijuana prices, Table 6; commodity prices, Grilli and Yang (1988).  See Clements (2002) for further details of the commodity
prices.           
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FIGURE 6 
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2  Source:  The Economist (2000/01); see Clements (2002) for further details.  
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Another well-known example of the impact of productivity improvement on 
prices is the case of personal computers. In a recent paper, Berndt and Rappoport (2001, 
p. 268) describe the enhanced capabilities of PCs over the last quarter of a century in the 
following terms: 
“When introduced in 1976, personal computers (PC’s) had only several 
kilobytes of random-access memory (RAM) and no hard disk,  processed 
commands at speeds of less than 1 megahertz (MHz), yet typically cost 
several thousand dollars. Today’s PC’s have megabytes (MB) of RAM and 
gigabytes of hard-disk memory, process commands at speeds exceeding 1,000 
MHz, and often cost less than $1,000. Ever more powerful PC boxes have 
been transformed into increasingly smaller and lighter notebooks.” 
 
Berndt and Rappoport compute quality-adjusted price index for PCs, with quality defined 
in terms of hard-disk memory, processor speed and the amount of RAM. Using more than 
9,000 observations on about 375 models per year, they find that for desktop PCs, prices 
declined over the period 1976-99 at an average rate of 27 percent p.a. and that the ratio of 
the price index in 1976 to that in 1999 is 1,445:1. For mobile PCs, prices declined by 
about 25 percent p.a. on average from 1983 to 1999. Although the above-documented 
declines in marijuana prices are very substantial among agricultural/horticultural 
commodities, they are still considerably less than those for PCs, which are nothing less 
than spectacular. There would seem to be fundamental differences to the limits to 
productivity enhancement for commodities that are  grown, and those that involve 
electronics such as computing, power generation and telecommunications. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that marijuana prices have decreased 
substantially more than many other commodities.  One reason is productivity 
enhancement in the cultivation of marijuana due to the extensive use of hydroponic 
techniques.  The magnitude of the price fall could also reflect in part the effects of an 
easing of the enforcement of prohibition laws.  It has been argued, however, that 
prohibition could have the perverse effect of lowering, not increasing, prices because 
illicit activities can evade many taxes and government regulations, and do not engage in 
costly advertising campaigns.  Miron (1998) argues: 
 
“The most direct effects of prohibition are on the supply and demand for 
drugs.  Prohibition tends to raise supply costs because suppliers face legal 
punishments for manufacturing, distributing and selling drugs.  More or less 
equivalently, black market suppliers incur the costs of bribing law 
enforcement authorities and elected officials so as to avoid these legal 
punishments.  Prohibition tends to decrease costs, however, because black  
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market suppliers of drugs face low marginal costs of evading government 
regulations and taxes, including environmental regulation, employment 
discrimination laws, child labour laws, antitrust laws, occupational health and 
safety regulation, income taxes, social security taxes and excise taxes.  
Similarly, suppliers of drugs produced in other countries face low marginal 
costs of evading tariffs and other import restrictions.  And prohibition can 
help maintain a market equilibrium in which suppliers do not advertise, which 
then permits lower prices (Motta, 1997). 
 
Prohibition tends to reduce the demand for drugs by creating legal penalties 
for possession of drugs, greater uncertainty about product q uality, and 
decreased availability at any given monetary price; it might also decrease 
demand because consumers exhibit ‘respect for the law’.  Prohibition tends to 
increase the demand for drugs, however, to the extent it creates a forbidden 
fruit effect.   
 
Beyond its direct effects on supply and demand, prohibition might also 
encourage increased market power or cartelisation in the drug industry ...  
Suppliers in a prohibited industry necessarily hide their activities from law-
enforcement officials, so they face low marginal costs of evading antitrust 
laws.  These suppliers also face low marginal costs of using violence to settle 
commercial disputes, which encourages collusion by permitting severe 
punishments.  To the extent that prohibition does encourage cartelisation, this 
will yield real profits rather than just quasi-rents offsetting law-evasion costs, 
and it will tend to reduce supply and increase price. 
 
On a priori grounds, therefore, prohibition has ambiguous effects on the price 
and quantity of drugs; both the magnitude and direction of these effects must 
be determined empirically.” 
 
Miron (1999a) studies the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption in the US 
during 1920-33.  Using the death rate from liver cirrhosis as a proxy for alcohol 
consumption, he finds that prohibition “exerted a modest and possibly even positive 
effect on consumption.”  This could be because prices fell for reasons given above.  But 
there are other possibilities including a highly inelastic demand for alcohol and/or 
prohibition giving alcohol the status of a “forbidden fruit” which some consumers might 
find attractive (Miron, 1999a).  To shed further light on the impact of prohibition on 
prices, Miron (1999b) also compares the markup from farmgate to retail of cocaine with 
that of several legal products.  He finds that while the markup for cocaine is high, it is of 
the same order of magnitude of that of chocolate, coffee, tea and barley/beer.  While there 
are other factors determining markups, this evidence is suggestive that illegality per se 
may not raise drug prices as much as some people might think.  On the basis of this and 
other evidence, Miron (1999b) concludes that “the current black market price of cocaine  
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is at most 2-3 times higher than it would be in a legal market, not 10-20 times higher as 
suggested in previous work”.  Consistent with this line of thinking is research which 
shows that increased enforcement of drug laws does not seem to result in higher prices 
(DiNardo, 1993, Weatherburn and Lind, 1997, Yuan and Caulkins, 1998). 
 
If the above arguments about prices and prohibition/enforcement are accepted, 
then we are left with productivity enhancement as the remaining explanation for the 
decrease in marijuana prices.  Productivity should probably be interpreted broadly to 
include both the use of better physical production techniques, such as hydroponics, as 
well as the enhanced ability of marijuana producers to evade taxes and regulations that 
would otherwise add to their costs.  A variation on this theme is that as it is the price of 
marijuana in terms of all other (legal) goods that has declined so much, increasing taxes 
and regulations that producers of other goods may have been subject to could also 
account for part of the reduction in the relative price of marijuana (Miron, 1999b). 
 
5.  Fact 3: Lower Prices have Boosted Marijuana Consumption and Reduced Drinking 
 
The section contains some explorations of the possible impact of the lower 
marijuana prices on marijuana usage, as well as their role on the consumption of an 
important substitute product, alcohol. 
 
Table 7 contains information on consumption and prices in Australia of three 
alcoholic beverages, beer, wine and spirits, as well as that for marijuana.  The 
consumption of marijuana is from Clements and Daryal (1999) who estimated it on the 
basis of the various National Drug  Strategy  Household Surveys, together with some 
additional assumptions that linked intensity of use to frequency of use.  Although all care 
was taken in preparing these estimates, it must be emphasised that they are likely to be 
subject to a substantial margin of error.  Table 8 reveals that per capita consumption of 
beer and wine declined at an average annual rate of  1.9  and  .5  percent, respectively, 
while that of spirits and marijuana rose by  .8  and  2.0  percent, respectively.  The 
nominal prices of the alcoholic beverages rose by  3-4 percent p.a. on average, while that 
of marijuana fell by  2.5  percent.  
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TABLE 7 
QUANTITIES CONSUMED AND PRICES OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
         
Year  Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
         
Quantities 
1988  141.4  25.82  3.993  .6467 
1989  141.6  24.32  4.048  .7049 
1990  139.9  22.85  3.870  .7652 
1991  134.9  23.01  3.614  .8278 
1992  127.8  23.23  3.595  .7695 
1993  123.8  23.14  3.982  .7090 
1994  122.1  23.19  4.168  .7120 
1995  120.2  22.96  4.130  .6913 
1996  118.7  23.29  4.106  .7442 
1997  117.6  24.18  4.158  .7575 
1998  116.9  24.63  4.318  .7875 
Mean  127.2  23.69  4.000  .7378 
Prices 
1988  2.819  6.190  30.578  - 
1989  2.928  6.607  33.315  - 
1990  3.116  6.801  36.601  577 
1991  3.271  6.883  39.064  547 
1992  3.361  7.056  40.532  454 
1993  3.478  7.271  41.847  446 
1994  3.583  7.597  43.044  475 
1995  3.724  7.983  44.254  476 
1996  3.891  8.306  45.687  484 
1997  3.981  8.559  46.714  489 
1998  4.020  8.755  47.088  473 
Mean  3.470  7.455  40.793  491 
 
Notes:   1. Quantities are per capita (14 years and over). 
2. Quantities consumed of the alcoholic beverages are in terms of litres; 
and that of marijuana is in ounces. 
3. Prices are in dollars per litre for the alcoholic beverages and per ounce for 
marijuana. 
Sources:  1. The marijuana prices are from column 6 of Table 3. 
  2. All other data are from Clements and Daryal (1999).  
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TABLE 8 
LOG-CHANGES IN QUANTITIES CONSUMED AND PRICES 
OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
         
         
Year  Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
         
Quantities 
1989     .21  -5.98   1.38  8.61 
1990  -1.23  -6.26  -4.49  8.22 
1991  -3.65     .70  -6.85  7.86 
1992  -5.43     .97    -.55  -7.31 
1993  -3.13   -.40           10.23  -8.18 
1994  -1.42    .22   4.57  .42 
1995  -1.55   -.97   -.91  -2.69 
1996  -1.29   1.43  -.57  7.38 
1997     -.89   3.73  1.25  1.76 
1998     -.57   1.83  3.78  3.89 
         
Mean   -1.90   -.47  .78  1.97 
         
Prices 
1989  3.83  6.51  8.57  - 
1990  6.20  2.90  9.41  - 
1991  4.86  1.19  6.51  -5.26 
1992  2.72  2.49  3.69  -18.71 
1993  3.41  3.00  3.19  -1.75 
1994  3.00  4.38  2.82  6.35 
1995  3.85  4.95  2.77  .25 
1996  4.40  3.97  3.19  1.64 
1997  2.27  3.00  2.22  1.09 
1998    .98  2.27    .80  -3.51 
         
Mean   3.55  3.47  4.32  -2.48 
         
Note: All entries are to be divided by 100. 
 
Table 9 gives a   4 4·   matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities,  from 
Clements and Daryal (1999) who estimated them from a version of the Rotterdam 
demand model under three assumptions.  First, that the consumption of alcohol and 
marijuana as a group are  separable in the utility function from all other goods.  
Second, that the four goods in question are preference independent so that they exhibit 
no utility interactions.  Third, the income elasticities of the four goods are fixed at 
values consistent with prior studies.  While these assumptions are restrictive, they are   
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TABLE 9 
         
COMPENSATED PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 
         
         
Good  Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
         
Beer   -.17  .03  .06  .08 
         
Wine   .09         -.36  .13  .15 
         
Spirits   .17  .13         -.60  .30 
         
Marijuana   .10  .08  .15         -.33 
         
Source: Clements and Daryal (1999). 
 
 
necessary to analyse the available data which are limited in both quantity and quality.  
The entries on the main diagonal of Table 9 indicate that the own-price elasticities are  
-.2 (beer),  -.4 (wine),  -.6  (spirits)  and  -.3 (marijuana).  The last column of the table 
gives the cross-price elasticities involving the price of marijuana; these are 
beer/marijuana  .1,  wine/marijuana .2  and spirits/marijuana  .3.  Note that the 
positive sign of each of these cross-elasticities implies that marijuana is a substitute 
for each alcoholic beverage.  While this is plausible, it should be noted that 
complementarity is ruled out by the preference independence assumption. 
 
We now use the cross-price elasticities to simulate consumption under the 
counter-factual assumption that marijuana prices did not fall as much as they did.  As 
alcohol and marijuana are substitutes, this will have the effect of stimulating 
consumption of three beverages and causing marijuana usage to grow by less.  Let  
it q   be the per capita consumption of good  i  ( 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 i = ,  for beer, wine, spirits 
and marijuana) in year  t  and let   1 t , i it it q log q log Dq - - =   be the corresponding log-
change from year  t-1  to t.  Then, if   ) p (log / ) q (log j i ij ¶ ¶ = h   is the elasticity of 
consumption of good  i  with respect to the price of good  j,  as an approximation it 
follows that   jt ij it Dp Dq · h = , where   jt Dp   is the log -change in the  jth  price.  In the 
simulation, let all determinants of consumption be unchanged except the price of 
marijuana, which is specified to take the value   4 p ˆ D .  The associated simulated value 
of the change in consumption of good  i  is then   4 4 i p ˆ D h .  This change in 
consumption holds everything else constant.  The impact on consumption of the  
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observed changes in all factors, including the price of marijuana, is incorporated in 
the observed log -change,   it Dq .  We shall allow these factors to vary as in fact they 
did, but we need to take out the impact of the observed changes in marijuana 
prices.  To avoid the appearance of being overly precise, suppose that in each year 
marijuana p rices change by a constant amount, by the mean log-change of   
-2.5  percent, which we denote by  a.  If marijuana prices were constant and the other 
determinants took their observed values, then the change in the consumption of good  
i  would be   a h - 4 i it Dq .  Adding back the effect due to the simulated price change  
4 p ˆ D ,  the simulated change in consumption of good  i  is  
 
(5.1)  ) p ˆ D ( Dq q ˆ D 4 4 i it it a - h + = . 
 
  To evaluate equation (5.1), we use   2 10 48 . 2
- · - = a ,  the mean log-change 
of marijuana prices.  The first term on the right-hand side of ( 5.1),   it Dq ,  is the 
observed quantity log-change for good  i, which is given in Table 8.  The price 
elasticity   4 i h   is the  i th  element of the last column of Table 9.  The final element in 
equation (5.1)  involves    4 p ˆ D ,  the simulated log-change in marijuana prices, for 
which we use two values.  First, we hold  nominal prices constant, so that   0 p ˆ D 4 = .  
Second, we assume that marijuana prices increase at the same rate as those of the 
alcoholic beverages, so that the price of marijuana in terms of alcohol is now held 
constant.  Clements and Daryal (1999) compute a Divisia index of the alcoholic 
beverage prices, and for the period 1989-98 the mean is  3.68  percent p.a.  Thus, we 
also set   2
4 10 68 . 3 p ˆ D
- · = . 
 
The results of the simulations are contained in Table 10.  To facilitate the 
comparison, Figure 7 plots for each good actual consumption in the first and last years 
(1990 and 1998), together with the two simulated values.  As actual marijuana prices 
fell over the period, the effect of holding them constant in the simulation is to cause 
consumption to grow less rapidly.  In fact, rather than marijuana consumption 
growing from  .77 oz  in 1990 to  .79  in 1998 (see column 5 of Table 10), when 
prices are held constant, consumption now falls from  .77 oz  to  .74  (column 9).  
Over this period, the average annual log-change in the p rice of marijuana is  
 -2.48 · 10-2.  As over the period 1990-98 there are 8 transitions from year  t-1  to  t ,  
holding the price constant in the simulation amounts to its log -change being   
8 · 2.48  · 10-2  » .198,  so that relative to actual the price i ncreases by about 20 
percent.  With an own-price elasticity of  -.33, this means that the log-change in 
consumption of marijuana would be  -.33  · 8  · 2.48  · 10-2  »  -.065,   
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TABLE 10 
ACTUAL AND SIMULATED QUANTITIES CONSUMED 
 
Simulated with marijuana prices   
Actual 
Constant  Growing at same rate as alcohol prices 
 
Year 
Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana  Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana  Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
1990  139.9  22.85  3.870  .7652  139.9  22.85  3.870  .7652  139.9  22.85  3.870  .7652 
1991  134.9  23.01  3.614  .8278  135.2  23.10  3.641  .8210  135.6  23.22  3.681  .8111 
1992  127.8  23.23  3.595  .7695  128.3  23.41  3.648  .7569  129.0  23.67  3.729  .7388 
1993  123.8  23.14  3.982  .7090  124.6  23.40  4.071  .6918  125.7  23.79  4.208  .6670 
1994  122.1  23.19  4.168  .7120  123.0  23.54  4.293  .6890  124.5  24.07  4.487  .6564 
1995  120.2  22.96  4.130  .6913  121.4  23.40  4.286  .6653  123.2  24.06  4.529  .6261 
1996  118.7  23.29  4.106  .7442  120.1  23.83  4.293  .7104  122.2  24.63  4.587  .6605 
1997  117.6  24.18  4.158  .7575  119.2  24.82  4.380  .7171  121.7  25.80  4.732  .6587 
1998  116.9  24.63  4.318  .7875  118.8  25.38  4.583  .7395  121.6  26.52  5.006  .6710 
Mean  124.7  23.39  3.993  .7516  125.6  23.75  4.118  .7285  127.0  24.29  4.314  .6950 
Note: See Table 7 for the units of measurement.  
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FIGURE 7 
ACTUAL AND SIMULATED CONSUMPTION OF FOUR GOODS 
 
  A.  Beer 
 
B.  Wine  
 
C.  Spirits  
 






































1990 1998 Year 
Litres  Litres 
Litres  Ounces  
  31 
or about  -6.5  percent.  As simulated and actual consumption in 1998 are  .7395  (column 9 
of Table 10) and  .7875  (column 5) respectively, the log-change is  
063 . 7875 . log 7395 . log - » - ,  or about  -6.3  percent, which is close enough to confirm 
the calculation in the previous sentence.  Columns 6 -8 of Table 10 show that when 
marijuana prices are held constant, the consumption of each of the three alcoholic beverages 
is higher than actual, which is due to alcohol and marijuana being substitutes. 
 
Panel A of Figure 8 compares consumption in 1998 of the four products when 
marijuana prices are held constant with actual consumption.  As can be seen, marijuana 
usage is about 6 percent lower than actual, as discussed above, while consumption of each 
alcoholic beverage is higher.  Beer consumption is higher by almost 2 percent, wine about 3 
percent and spirits about 6 percent.   This ranking of the effects on consumption  
-- beer, then wine and then spirits  -- follows from the values of the cross elasticities 
involving the price of marijuana.  From the last column of Table 9, these are  .1,  .2  and  .3  
for beer/marijuana, wine/marijuana and spirits/marijuana, respectively.  The results of the 
simulation when marijuana prices grow at the same rate as alcohol prices are given in the 
last four columns of Table 10, the broken lines in Figure 7 and in Panel B of Figure 8.   
Qualitatively, the results are the same as before -- marijuana usage falls and drinking rises.  
But the magnitude of the effects are much larger as now the price of marijuana increases by 
much more: In the previous simulation, the log-change in the price over the period 1990 to 
1998 was  8 · 2.48 · 10
-2 » 20  percent, whereas now it is  8 · (2.48 + 3.68) · 10
-2 » 49  
percent.  As in the two simulations, these price changes are multiplied by the same 
elasticities, it follows that for each product the quantity change in the second simulation is  
2
1 2 20 / 49 »   times that of the first. 
 
What can be said about the welfare effects of the changes in the price of marijuana?  
This is a difficult question for several reasons.  First, if we were to use consumer surplus to 
evaluate the impact of the lower price, as the height of the demand curve is interpreted as 
the marginal valuation of an additional gram of marijuana consumed, no account would be 
taken of externalities.  But are these externalities positive or negative for marijuana?  In 
some cases, marijuana may affect users in such a manner that they can interact “better” with 
other members of society, so that additional consumption confers a positive externality.  But  




CHANGE IN CONSUMPTION IN 1998 
(Simulated relative to actual) 










in other cases, marijuana usage would surely lead to negative externalities, such as road 
accidents etc. that harm innocent parties.  There could also be health costs associated 
with high marijuana consumption, but whether or not these constitute an externality 
depends on the institutional arrangements for funding health care.  It is not easy to judge 
where the net balance would lie between positive and negative externalities.  A further 
complication relates to the interaction in consumption between marijuana usage and 
drinking.  As consumption of alcoholic beverages and marijuana are likely to be 
substitutes, a fall in the price of the latter leads to less drinking.  If there are externalities 
associated with drinking (again, are these positive or negative on balance?), a complete 
analysis of the welfare effects of the fall in marijuana prices would require that the 
reduced ex ternal costs/benefits of drinking also be accounted for.  A final problem 
relates to the quality of marijuana.  The increasing use of hydroponic techniques has in 
all probability enhanced the quality of the product such as increasing THC levels.  
Accordingly, quality-constant prices are likely to have declined by even more than our 
prices.  Unfortunately, we have no information on quality to make the appropriate 
adjustments. 
 
Due to the above problems, we confine our welfare comparisons to the change in 
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change is just the price decline times consumption,   t q p· D - ,  and the question of just 
what consumption to use ( = t q  base period, curren t period, geometric mean, etc.) is the 
subject matter of much of index-number theory.  As shown in Table 11, using 
Laspeyres’ (base-period consumption), Paasche (current-period) and the Fisher ideal 
(geometric mean) approaches, the price fall induces a rise in real income of about  $80  
per capita p. a.  As in 1998 there were about  15  million people (14 years and over) in 
Australia, in the aggregate real income increases by more than  $1,200m p. a. as a result 
of the lower price of marijuana.  This real i ncome increase need to be carefully 
interpreted as its distribution is far from uniform.  As a small number of heavy users 
account for a large share of total marijuana consumption (Clements and Daryal, 1999), it 
is clear that these heavy users receive most of the gains, while others receive little or no 
benefit from the lower prices. 
 
6.   Concluding Comments 
 
This paper has identified a substantial decline in the relative price of marijuana, 
discussed the possible causes and analysed some of the implications.  Rather than 
reiterating the findings, we comment briefly on some of their broader implications: 
 
•  By their very nature, illicit goods and services are excluded from official 
statistics.  If the prices of other illicit activities have fallen as much as  
that of marijuana, the CPI will be overstated, and real incomes and productivity 
measures will be understated. 
 
•  Further studies of illicit sectors of the economy could be rewarding in 
understanding how incentives operate to encourage the adoption of new 
technology.  This may provide some guidance regarding appropriate policies to 
boost productivity in legal activities, and in the identification of impediments to 
the introduction of technological improvements.  
 
•  Our estimates show that the lower price of marijuana has substantially reduced 
consumption of a substitute product, alcohol.  Producers of beer, wine and 
spirits may thus be tempted to argue that on the basis of considerations of 
competitive neutrality, marijuana production should be legalised and subject to 
the same hefty taxes as they are. 
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TABLE 11 
MARIJUANA AND REAL INCOME 
Change in real income 











(Oz per capita)  Laspeyres’ 
) 1990 t ( =  
Paasche 
) 1998 t ( =  
Fisher 
) 1998 1990 t ( · =  
1990  577  .7652       
1998  473  .7875       
q , p D D   -104  .0223       
t q p· D -       79.5  81.9  80.7 
 
•  Suppose marijuana were legalised and its production taxed.  In view of the 
apparent ease with which marijuana can n ow be grown with hydroponic 
techniques and because demand is almost surely price inelastic, it would be 
consumers who would bear the bulk of the incidence of the tax, not growers.  
In such a case, maybe the incentives to innovate would remain more or less 
unchanged in a legalised regime. 
 
•  Economic historians have long studied the impacts of innovation and how the 
benefits are distributed between shareholders, workers and consumers.  A 
leading example of this work relates to textile production in the industrial 
revolution in Britain for which it has been estimated that about half of the 
benefits from falling prices went overseas in the form of a worsening of 
Britain’s terms of trade (Crafts, 2001, IMF, 2001, Chap. 3).  During the recent 
IT boom, it would also seem that the bulk of the benefits took the form of 
lower prices, rather than higher profits and wages (IMF, 2001, Chap. 3).  In 
related research, Baumol (2002) estimates that on average only 20 percent of 
the benefits of innovation are captured by the innovators themselves.  
Although no data exist on the profitability of marijuana production, or on 
wages paid, the substantial decline in prices would seem to point to the 
distributional effects of innovation within the marijuana industry as being not 
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